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ABSTRACT: Corporate governance principles comprise significant laws imposed 
by legislature as well as nationally and internationally recognized regulations set 
out by companies’ owners. They aim at providing a solid and lawful basis for di-
recting and controlling corporate affairs. More than ten years ago, these principles 
were specified in form of national corporate governance codes in many European 
countries and have been constantly redefined since then. This paper features an 
analysis of the current acceptance of corporate governance codes among the largest 
German and Austrian stock-listed companies. The analysis is based on data pro-
vided by the companies in their corporate governance reports of fiscal year 2014. 
I find that the Austrian code acceptance rate of 98.3% surpasses the rate of 97.2% 
in Germany. Simultaneously, the average amount of code deviations per company 
in Austria (1.5) is considerably lower than the German figure (1.8). In Germany, 
the most quoted deviation applies to the severance pay cap for management. De-
viations quoted the most in Austria refer to the setup of management board’s com-
pensation, the existence of a nomination committee, supervisory board’s prohibi-
tion to assume functions on competitors' boards, as well as audit assessments of 
the effectiveness of the company’s risk management. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, corporate governance has grown to become an es-
sential topic in today’s business live. In general, it can be considered as 
the legal and factual framework for leading and steering companies (v. 
Werder, 2015). It determines how organs of companies (i.e. management 
and supervisory board) fulfil their responsibilities (Root, 1998). Thereby, 
it sets the ethical background of business dealings (Wichert, 2015). 
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Corporate governance comprises significant laws imposed by legis-
lature as well as nationally and internationally recognized regulations set 
out by companies’ owners and aims at providing a solid and lawful basis 
for directing and controlling corporate affairs. To work effectively, it 
should balance the necessity to hold supervisory board and management 
responsible towards shareholders and the necessity to provide a sufficient 
level of flexibility to allow good faith business decisions without fearing 
litigation (Root, 1998).  
By complying with corporate governance requirements, companies 
strengthen trust towards shareholders, customers, employees, and the gen-
eral public. Also, corporate governance aims at creating transparency and 
comprehensiveness (Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Gov-
ernance Kodex, 2015). Moreover, corporate governance directs corporate 
activities towards responsible, sustainable, and long term-oriented value 
creation (Österreichischer Arbeitskreis für Corporate Governance, 2015).  
The beginning of this century was marked by a range of corporate 
scandals which were characterized by companies as Enron and WorldCom 
boosting their financial statements and engaging in illegal management 
practices (Dorfman, 2004). Although not the only cause, these events 
shifted public attention to topics as governance, risk, and compliance 
(short: GRC) and accelerated the further development and introduction of 
laws and standards in these fields. Since its introduction in 2002, the Sar-
banes-Oxley-Act has required all companies being listed on the U.S.-
American stock exchange to implement internal control systems and to 
regularly report about its design and operating effectiveness (U.S. Con-
gress, 2002). Furthermore, a range of widely accepted standards, guide-
lines, and frameworks have emerged over the following years (e.g. COSO 
for enterprise risk management, internal control, and fraud deterrence to 
enable good organizational governance, COBIT for governance and man-
agement of enterprise IT, ISO 31000 for risk management to provide 
sound principles for effective management and corporate governance) 
(COSO, 2015; ISACA, 2015; ISO, 2015). These developed to become 
global cornerstones for corporate governance and risk challenges for both 
stock-listed and non-stock-listed companies. In many countries, national 
legislature has reacted to the increased demand in GRC topics by defining 
specific principles in form of national corporate governance codes which 
have been constantly redefined over the years. These codes ask companies 
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to comply with its principles and to report on compliance with the code 
on a regular basis (European Corporate Governance Institute, 2015). 
The following table shows a selection of corporate governance codes 
and their year of introduction in various European countries.  
Table 1.:  Selection of corporate governance codes in Europe 
 Corporate Governance Code Year of  
Introduction 
Great Britain UK Corporate Governance Code 2000 
Germany Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2002 
Austria Österreichischer Corporate Governance Kodex 2002 
Switzerland Swiss Code of Best Practice 2002 
France Loi de Sécurité Financière 2003 
Netherlands Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code 2003 
Spain Código de buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas 2006 
Source: European Corporate Governance Institute, 2015 
Problem definition and relevant literature 
While the codes’ principles outline specific rules for companies to follow, 
the code itself is only of recommendatory nature. Therefore, companies 
are not required to comply with them.  
Also, the implementation, administration, and continuous develop-
ment of corporate governance systems require costs and limit manage-
ment and supervisory board in their corporate activities. Companies may 
therefore opt not to comply with the code due to commercial reasons. 
Although the corporate governance codes differ in their structure and 
content from country to country, the codes’ principles mostly comprise 
the following kinds of rules: 
 Legal rules: These are derived from laws and must be fulfilled by 
the companies, irrespective of whether they apply the code as a 
whole or not. 
 Comply-or-Explain rules: Companies are asked to comply with 
these requirements or to disclaim reasons for why they deviate 
from these. 
 Recommendations: Companies are not obliged to comply with 
these rules, nor are they required to disclaim any deviations.  
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Thus, even if companies report on corporate governance in accordance 
with the code of their country, the Comply-or-Explain ruling bears the risk 
of companies whitewashing deviations from the code and thereby covering 
up potential shortcomings in their corporate governance structures.  
Provided the aforementioned aspects, it is of interest to investigate 
the acceptance of corporate governance as defined in the national corpo-
rate governance codes, especially given the fact that most codes have been 
active for more than ten years. 
Studies approaching this issue were carried out by diverse authors. 
Annually, the Center for Corporate Governance at the Handelshochschule 
Leipzig publishes a report on the acceptance of the German corporate gov-
ernance code among companies listed on the German stock exchange 
(Rapp & Wolff, 2015). Von Werder and Turkali (2005) published a simi-
lar report about the code acceptance and code application among German 
companies. Hudelist, Wieser, and Gahleitner (2012) published a study on 
the acceptance of corporate governance in Austria, on the occasion of the 
Austrian’s code being in place for ten years. All three studies focus on a 
single country only and do not include any comparisons to other countries. 
While the German studies favour a more quantitative approach, the ap-
proach chosen in the Austrian study is a more qualitative one. Therefore, 
comparing findings of these studies is hardly possible and would not de-
liver useful insights. The U.S.-American law firm Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges LLP (2014) carried out a comparison of selected corporate gov-
ernance codes among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, the OECD, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, 
Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
This study compares the selected codes based on a wide range of fields 
(e.g. corporate governance transparency, independent board leadership, 
shareholder input in director selection). Despite its cross-national charac-
ter, the study does not incorporate analytical steps in regard to the degree 
of corporate governance acceptance among the selected countries.  
Therefore, this analysis features an in-depth analysis of the current 
acceptance of corporate governance codes among German and Austrian 
companies being part of their country’s leading share index. The countries 
Germany and Austria were chosen due to two reasons: Firstly, both Ger-
many and Austria introduced their national corporate governance codes in 
2002 and therefore have gained experience over a comparable length. Sec-
ondly, the German and the Austrian corporate governance codes possess 
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a high similarity in terms of content and structure and are therefore suita-
ble for comparisons.  
In specific, the following research objectives were defined on a per 
country level:  
1. To identify the average acceptance rate indicting the extent to which 
incorporated companies of either Germany and Austria follow the 
principles of the respective corporate governance code 
2. To determine the relative amount of deviations per application field 
as set out by the respective corporate governance code 
3. To determine the absolute amount of deviations per principle as set 
out by the respective corporate governance code 
Methodology and data 
The analysis incorporates all companies of the two countries’ leading 
stock indexes Deutscher Aktienindex (short: DAX) and Austrian Traded 
Index (short: ATX) as per December 31th 2014.  
Table 2.:  Overview of companies of leading stock indexes as per 
Dec. 31st 2014 
DAX company (Germany) ATX company (Austria) 
Adidas AG Andritz AG 
Allianz SE Buwog AG  
BASF SE CA Immobilien Anlagen AG  
Bayer AG Conwert Immobilien Invest SE  
Beiersdorf AG Erste Group Bank AG  
BMW AG Flughafen Wien AG  
Commerzbank AG Immofinanz AG  
Continental AG Lenzing AG  
Daimler AG Österreichische Post AG  
Deutsche Bank AG OMV AG  
Deutsche Börse AG Raiffeisen Bank International AG  
Deutsche Lufthansa AG RHI AG  
Deutsche Post AG Schoeller-Bleckmann Oilfield Equipment AG  
Deutsche Telekom AG Telekom Austria AG  
E.ON SE Uniqa Insurance Group AG  
Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA Verbund AG 
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DAX company (Germany) ATX company (Austria) 
Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA  Vienna Insurance Group AG  
HeidelbergCement AG Voestalpine AG  
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA Wienerberger AG  
Infineon Technologies AG Zumtobel Group AG  
K+S AG  
Lanxess AG  
Linde AG  
Merck KGaA  
Münchener Rück AG  
RWE AG  
SAP SE  
Siemens AG  
ThyssenKrupp AG  
Volkswagen AG  
Source: Deutsche Börse AG, 2015; Wiener Börse AG, 2015 
Required information in regard to the compliance with single princi-
ples of the German and Austrian corporate governance codes were drawn 
from the company’s corporate governance reports of fiscal year 2014 or, 
if the company has an non-calendar fiscal year, of fiscal year 2014/2015. 
For German companies, also conformity statements indicating the extent 
of compliance with the corporate governance code on an aggregated level 
were considered for the same period.  
For research objective (1) 
To determine the average acceptance rate per country, the acceptance rate 
per company was determined at first (amount of fulfilled principles over 
the amount of total principles). Afterwards, the results were added on a 
country level and divided by the amount of companies per country. This 
mathematical procedure can be expressed with the following formula:  
 AARc = 
1
𝑁𝑐
 ∑  (
𝑋𝑓
𝑋𝑐
)𝑁𝑐𝑖=1  (1) 
with  Xf = amount of fulfilled principles per company 
 Xc = amount of total principles per country 
 Nc = amount of companies per country 
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Each principle was regarded as equal element, irrespective of its im-
portance to the company, its extent (one or several rules included), or their 
nature (legal rule, comply-or-explain rule, or recommendation). 
For research objective (2) 
While the Germany corporate governance code covers six application 
fields, the Austrian pendant holds only five fields. These are provided in 
the following table.  
Table 3.:  Application fields of German and Austrian corporate 
governance code 
German Code Austrian Code 
Shareholders and the General Meeting Shareholders and the General Meeting 
Management Board Management Board 
Supervisory Board  Supervisory Board  
Cooperation between Management Board 
and Supervisory Board 
Cooperation between Management Board 
and Supervisory Board 
Transparency Transparency and Auditing 
Reporting and Audit of the Annual Finan-
cial Statements 
 
Source: Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, 2015; 
Österreichischer Arbeitskreis für Corporate Governance, 2015 
For determining the relative amount of deviations per application 
field, six application fields as set out in the German code were considered. 
Principles covered in the “Transparency and Auditing” chapter of the 
Austrian code were split into two parts in accordance with the naming of 
the subchapters’ headings and allocated to either “Transparency” or “Re-
porting and Audit of the Annual Financial Statements”. To determine the 
relative amount of deviations per application field, all deviations reported 
by the companies of each country were aligned to one of the six applica-
tion fields. To account for the different amount of companies per country, 
the sum of deviations per application field was divided by the amount of 
companies.  
For research objective (3) 
To identify the absolute amount of deviations per principle, reported de-
viations were allocated to the principles as set out by both the German and 
the Austrian code.  
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Results 
For research objective (1) 
Based on the aforementioned formula, the average acceptance rate 
amounts to 98.3% for Austria and 97.2% for Germany. Moreover, the fol-
lowing descriptive statistics were determined for the data sample: 
Table 4.:  Descriptive statistics for German and Austrian data set 
 Germany Austria 
Minimum 90.5% 95.6% 
1st Quartile 95.6% 97.5% 
Median 98.4% 98.9% 
3rd Quartile 99.6% 99.2% 
Maximum 100.0% 100.0% 
N 30 20 
Mean 97.2% 98.3% 
Standard Deviation 0.027088 0.013380 
 
These statistics are depicted in the following figure:  
 
Figure 1.: Box plots for German and Austrian data set 
Source: Own investigations 
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The average acceptance rate for Austrian companies slightly sur-
passes the value for German companies. At the same time, spread and 
standard deviation are larger in German data set. 
For research objective (2) 
The amount of deviations per application field is shown in the following 
figure: 
 
Figure 2.: Absolute amount of deviations per application field per 
country 
Source: Own investigations 
On average, each German company reports 1.8 deviations from the 
codes while each Austrian company reports 1.5 deviations. Accounted for 
the number of companies considered in each of the two data sets, the rel-
ative amount of deviations per application field is presented in the follow-
ing figure:  
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Figure 3: Relative amount of deviations per application field per 
country 
Source: Own investigations 
Application fields “supervisory board” and “management board” 
hold the most deviations from the code in both countries (93% and 60% 
in Germany, 60% and 60% in Austria). Particularly striking, almost every 
German company holds a deviation in application field “supervisory 
board” on average. Regarding application fields “Cooperation between 
the Supervisory Board and the Management Board”, “Shareholders and 
the General Meeting”, as well as “Transparency”, companies of both 
countries hardly deviate from the corporate governance codes (≤10%).  
For research objective (3) 
The following figure lists the principles most deviated from as well as the 
amount of deviations as reported by both German and Austrian compa-
nies:  
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Figure 4.: Most quoted deviations per principle per country 
Source: Own investigations 
In Germany, by far the most quoted deviation applies to the severance 
pay cap for management. Also, practices in regard to supervisory board’s 
composition to ensure proper task allocation and objective definition as 
well as supervisory board's compensation were quoted frequently to devi-
ate from the code. Deviations quoted the most in Austria refer to the com-
position of management board’s compensation, the existence of a nomi-
nation committee, supervisory board’s prohibition to assume functions on 
competitors' boards, as well as auditors’ assessments of the effectiveness 
of the company’s risk management.  
In Austria, five companies (corresponding to 25% of all Austrian 
companies) do not report any deviation from the code and are therefore 
fully compliant with the code. In Germany, the same figure amounts to 
eight companies (corresponding to 27% of all German companies). 
Conclusion 
Provided the average acceptance rates of 98.3% and 97.2% respectively, 
the acceptance of corporate governance in Austria and Germany can be 
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regarded as comparably high. Acceptance in Austria was found to be 
slightly above the acceptance rate in Germany. While the composition of 
deviations based on application fields appears to be similar in both com-
panies, the setup is different on a principle level. Deviations appear to be 
more heterogeneous in Austria as most quoted deviations are spread more 
evenly among several principles. In both countries the application field 
“management board”, especially principles referring the compensation of 
management hold a comparably high level of deviations.  
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